Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX): 5 FORCES Analysis [Nov-2025 Updated]

You're analyzing a company that, frankly, isn't competing anymore. Better Therapeutics, Inc.'s decision back in March 2024 to wind down operations and seek strategic alternatives means the standard Porter's Five Forces analysis becomes less about future strategy and more about a stark, late-2025 post-mortem on the digital therapeutics space. Honestly, the forces were stacked against them: suppliers lost all leverage as the company terminated staff, but the real killers were the customers, who faced zero switching costs, and the overwhelming threat of substitutes, like established drugs such as Ozempic. We need to look closely at this failure, especially given the market cap dropped to roughly $5.451k, to understand the high-risk environment that new entrants still face today.

Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of suppliers

You're looking at a situation where the bargaining power of suppliers for Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX) is definitively on the low end of the spectrum, bordering on negligible. Honestly, this isn't about negotiating better terms anymore; it's about orderly cessation. The company announced it is terminating its employees and exploring strategic alternatives, which included a full or partial wind-down of the business, as far back as March 2024. By late 2025, this trajectory suggests minimal, if any, ongoing operational needs that would necessitate supplier engagement.

The core reason for this supplier weakness is the company's operational status. With the workforce being terminated, there's simply no internal demand to drive up supplier leverage. Furthermore, the digital therapeutics assets were acquired by Click Therapeutics in May 2024, which means the need for ongoing clinical trial services or specialized software development-the very things that might give a supplier leverage-has evaporated or been transferred.

Key suppliers, such as those providing cloud infrastructure or specialized third-party services, face a very low switching cost from Better Therapeutics, Inc.'s perspective, especially given the wind-down scenario. Contracts are either terminated outright or are in the process of being settled for minimal value. You can bet that any vendor holding a contract with Better Therapeutics, Inc. right now is more concerned with recovering any outstanding invoice than dictating terms.

The financial reality seals this dynamic. The purchasing leverage that a company usually wields-based on volume and future potential-is gone. As of November 21, 2025, the market capitalization for Better Therapeutics, Inc. stood at a mere $5.45 thousand, with other reports showing figures like $5.452K on November 26, 2025. That is a dramatic collapse from its initial SPAC valuation of $187 million in April 2021. Here's the quick math: a market cap in the thousands means zero negotiating clout.

The supplier power assessment looks like this:

The implications for any remaining vendor relationship are clear:

• Power shifts entirely to Better Therapeutics, Inc. for contract termination.
• Suppliers cannot demand premium pricing for services.
• Future revenue stream from Better Therapeutics, Inc. is non-existent.
• The company's prior employee count of 54 is now irrelevant to demand.

Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of customers

You're looking at a situation where the customer-whether it's the PBM, the health plan, the prescribing physician, or the patient-holds virtually all the cards. For Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX), the bargaining power of customers is, quite frankly, extremely high, primarily because the product, AspyreRx, never established a viable commercial path post-FDA authorization in July 2023.

Payers (PBMs/health plans) have high leverage due to BTTX's failure to secure broad reimbursement. While Better Therapeutics, Inc. announced a rebate agreement with one of the largest Pharmacy Benefit Managers in the US, covering over 70 million lives, this agreement was only effective January 1, 2024, to add AspyreRx to their formularies with rebate eligibility. This was a step toward broad coverage, not the achievement of it. The subsequent announcement in March 2024 that the Company would seek strategic alternatives, including a potential wind-down of the Company, confirms that this broad coverage was not realized to a sustainable degree. When a company is exploring a wind-down, the leverage held by any remaining customer or payer is absolute.

Prescribing physicians and patients have zero switching cost to abandon the product. AspyreRx is a prescription digital therapeutic (PDT) intended to be used adjunctively with standard of care. If a payer denies coverage or a patient faces a high out-of-pocket cost, the physician can immediately switch the prescription to an established, well-reimbursed alternative. The cost to switch from a digital therapy to a traditional medication is negligible for the prescriber and minimal for the patient, especially when the alternative is covered.

The lack of a going concern makes any new prescription adoption nearly impossible. Following the March 2024 announcement regarding the exploration of strategic alternatives and the voluntary request for delisting from Nasdaq, the market perception of Better Therapeutics, Inc.'s viability collapsed. This status signals to any potential prescriber or payer that the long-term support, updates, and clinical infrastructure for AspyreRx cannot be guaranteed, effectively halting new adoption.

Customers already have access to numerous, well-reimbursed alternative treatments for Type 2 Diabetes (T2D). AspyreRx was designed to be used in addition to standard of care. These established alternatives-including classes like metformin, DPP4 inhibitors, GLP-1 receptor agonists, and insulin-are generally covered by payers, creating a very low barrier for continued use over a novel, potentially cash-pay product.

Here's the quick math on the pricing contrast you face when dealing with payers:

The leverage points for customers are clear and numerous, making negotiation power heavily skewed away from Better Therapeutics, Inc.:

• Payer leverage due to lack of widespread formulary inclusion.
• Physician inertia favoring established, reimbursed options.
• Patient sensitivity to the $750 list price without guaranteed coverage.
• The company's operational uncertainty following the March 2024 strategic review announcement.
• Availability of established T2D therapies that are generally covered.

If onboarding takes 14+ days for a new prescription pathway, churn risk rises substantially, though in this case, the risk is near total abandonment due to the company's status.

Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday.

Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX) - Porter's Five Forces: Competitive rivalry

You're looking at the competitive landscape for Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX) as of late 2025, and honestly, the rivalry is over for them. Better Therapeutics, Inc. exited the commercial field, unable to sustain the fight against established players and the steep climb of market adoption. This capitulation is cemented by the fact that Click Therapeutics, Inc. acquired Assets of Better Therapeutics, Inc.. That move signals the end of the line for Better Therapeutics, Inc. as an independent competitor in this space.

The competitive rivalry didn't just disappear; it shifted. Remaining digital therapeutics (PDTs) and health tech firms are now consolidating and gaining market share in a sector that is still expanding rapidly. The overall Digital Therapeutics Market size is estimated to be around USD 9.2 billion to USD 9.96 billion in 2025. This growth is substantial, with some projections showing a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 25.86% through 2030.

Here's a quick look at the market scale that the survivors are fighting over:

The core issue for Better Therapeutics, Inc., which ultimately led to its exit, was failing to overcome commercialization hurdles that competitors also grapple with. Prescription DTx (Rx, regulated) depend heavily on reimbursement or employer coverage, which is a slow but secure market pathway. While the industry saw the launch of three mental-health billing codes in 2025, which vaulted digital interventions into mainstream benefit design, securing consistent, broad payer adoption remains tough. The company's focus on cardiometabolic diseases meant competing for formulary inclusion against established pharmaceutical and digital rivals.

The failure of Better Therapeutics, Inc. follows the earlier high-profile setbacks in the sector, most notably Pear Therapeutics. This sequence signals a high-risk environment for pure-play PDT developers. The industry has experienced 'big setbacks over the last few years,' even as the overall market matures. The trend shows that competitive intensity is rising, with large health-technology firms and pharmaceutical companies actively absorbing niche developers.

The competitive dynamics that Better Therapeutics, Inc. could not master include:

• Securing favorable reimbursement pathways.
• Achieving scale against larger, better-funded tech firms.
• Navigating the slow, rigorous regulatory pathway for Rx DTx.
• Converting clinical validation into consistent prescription volume.

The market is clearly moving toward consolidation, which is a classic sign of intense rivalry where smaller, less capitalized players get acquired or fail. Finance: review the latest SEC filings from Click Therapeutics, Inc. to estimate the value of the acquired Better Therapeutics, Inc. assets by next Tuesday.

Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of substitutes

You're looking at the competitive landscape for Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX) and the threat of substitutes is, frankly, the most pressing issue facing the company. The sheer scale and efficacy of alternatives to their prescription digital therapeutic (PDT), AspyreRx, puts immense pressure on adoption and market penetration. We see this reflected in the financials; for instance, Better Therapeutics, Inc. reported a trailing twelve months (ttm) Net Income of -$31.57M, which definitely suggests the market has favored substitutes over their novel approach so far.

The primary substitutes fall into two massive, well-established categories: potent pharmacological treatments and the broader digital health ecosystem. For a company whose lead product, AspyreRx, is designed to treat adults with Type 2 Diabetes (T2D) using cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), the competition is formidable. It's not just about a similar product; it's about established, highly effective treatments that physicians and patients already trust.

The pharmacological giants, specifically the GLP-1 receptor agonists, represent an existential threat. These drugs, which mimic the GLP-1 hormone, are highly effective at both glycemic control and weight loss, with some trials showing weight loss up to 20%. The market size for these substitutes is staggering and growing rapidly. The global GLP-1 Receptor Agonist market was valued at USD 52.08 billion in 2024 and is projected to hit USD 62.83 billion in 2025 alone. Looking further out, the market is expected to compound at a 16.8% CAGR through 2032, reaching USD 186.64 billion. The dominance of specific drugs like Semaglutide, which accounted for a 34.17% share of the market in 2024, shows where the prescription volume is going. Plus, the established monthly cost in the U.S. is around USD 1,000, meaning switching costs for a physician to prescribe an established, covered drug over a new PDT are low, even if the drug is expensive.

Here's a quick look at the scale of the substitute markets as of 2025 estimates:

The digital health space also presents a threat, though the market is smaller. Other digital health and wellness apps offer similar behavioral support, often at a lower or zero cost to the patient. The Global Diabetes Apps Market is estimated at USD 11.53 Bn in 2025. While Better Therapeutics, Inc. seeks reimbursement like a traditional medicine, many competitors operate on freemium or subscription models. For example, in the broader Diabetes Management Apps segment, subscription-based services made up 34% of the total revenue in 2024. Even though these apps have an average user rating of 4.7 out of 5, adoption remains low, but their sheer volume and low entry barrier mean they compete for the same patient engagement time and physician recommendation.

The switching cost dynamic heavily favors the established substitutes. For a physician to prescribe AspyreRx, they must navigate a new reimbursement pathway for a digital product, which is a significant hurdle compared to writing a script for a drug already covered by the patient's formulary. For patients, moving from an established pharmacological treatment, even one with side effects, to a new digital therapy requires a behavioral shift that is difficult to enforce without strong clinical differentiation beyond what GLP-1s already offer in terms of hard outcomes like A1c reduction and weight loss. The fact that Better Therapeutics, Inc. is announcing data on the concurrent use of AspyreRx and GLP-1 Receptor Agonists underscores that the market views them as complementary, not a direct replacement, which is a tough position to hold when trying to capture market share.

Finance: draft a sensitivity analysis on AspyreRx adoption assuming a 10% conversion rate from patients on GLP-1s by Q2 2026.

Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of new entrants

You're looking at the barriers to entry for the prescription digital therapeutics (PDT) space that Better Therapeutics, Inc. (BTTX) was navigating. Honestly, the threat from brand-new players trying to replicate this model right now is moderate to low. The industry has seen high-profile setbacks, which acts as a massive, albeit painful, deterrent for fresh capital and new teams. The experience of BTTX, which received FDA authorization for AspyreRx™ in July 2023 but subsequently faced delisting from NASDAQ in March 2024 and ultimately saw its assets auctioned for a reported $6 million (following Pear Therapeutics' earlier bankruptcy), paints a stark picture of the execution risk involved.

The primary moat protecting this niche comes from the regulatory gauntlet. New entrants must clear the same high regulatory hurdle that BTTX faced: securing FDA authorization, often via the De Novo pathway for novel devices. BTTX's AspyreRx, which delivers cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for Type 2 Diabetes (T2D), required this clearance based on data from a randomized controlled trial involving 668 subjects. This process is time-consuming and capital-intensive, definitely weeding out many potential competitors before they even reach the market. The fact that the FDA authorized AspyreRx based on a mean HbA1c reduction of 1.3% for half the users after 180 days shows the level of clinical proof required.

Capital availability for pure-play PDTs has tightened considerably following these high-profile failures. While the broader digital health sector raised $3 billion across 122 deals in Q1 2025, institutional investors are now prioritizing companies with proven unit economics and clear reimbursement pathways. New entrants must secure significant funding to survive the multi-year FDA process, but the market memory of BTTX and Pear Therapeutics makes that initial capital raise much harder. Here's the quick math: the capital required to get a product like AspyreRx through development and regulatory review is substantial, and the failure of BTTX suggests that capital alone isn't enough.

Securing robust payer reimbursement remains the Achilles' heel of the entire PDT model, a challenge Better Therapeutics, Inc. ultimately could not conquer at scale. While BTTX announced a rebate agreement in February 2024 with a Pharmacy Benefit Manager (PBM) negotiating on behalf of over 70 million lives, this did not translate into sustainable commercial success or prevent the company's later operational collapse. New entrants face the same uphill battle: convincing payers to cover software like a traditional prescription medication, despite the existence of new CMS HCPCS codes created between 2020 and 2025 to facilitate this. Without this coverage, physician adoption stalls, and revenue generation is severely limited.

We also have to consider the threat from existing tech giants, like Apple or Google, who certainly possess the capital and technical expertise to develop similar software. However, the regulatory path acts as a significant, perhaps insurmountable, deterrent for them to enter the prescription digital therapeutic space directly. They are more likely to focus on wellness or remote patient monitoring (RPM/RTM) codes, which have different, often less stringent, regulatory requirements than a product requiring FDA De Novo clearance. The barriers to entry for a true PDT competitor are summarized below:

The landscape is defined by these structural impediments. New entrants face a high fixed cost of entry-the regulatory and clinical validation-without a guaranteed payoff on the back end from payers. The market has effectively been segmented into two tiers: the established, though struggling, FDA-cleared players, and the vast, unregulated digital health market. For a new company to succeed, they must not only clear the FDA hurdle but also solve the reimbursement puzzle that Better Therapeutics, Inc. could not fully resolve.

• FDA De Novo clearance is a prerequisite for PDTs.
• Capital markets are wary after recent PDT bankruptcies.
• Payer coverage is the critical, unproven commercial step.
• Tech giants face regulatory friction for prescription products.

Finance: draft updated cash runway analysis factoring in current market sentiment by Monday.