Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK): 5 FORCES Analysis [Nov-2025 Updated]

You're looking for a clear, no-fluff breakdown of Mammoth Energy Services, Inc.'s (TUSK) market position, and honestly, the company's 2025 strategic shift makes this a defintely complex analysis. After shedding major operations, the remaining business-focused on niche utility infrastructure and a smaller sand segment reporting Q3 2025 revenue of just $14.8 million from continuing operations-faces a unique set of pressures. We see strong customer power due to volatile energy prices, evidenced by the $18.26 per ton average for Natural Sand Proppant, set against high capital barriers in their new aviation focus. As your seasoned analyst, I've mapped out exactly where the leverage lies across all five of Porter's forces so you can see the near-term risks and opportunities clearly. Dive in below to see the full, unvarnished picture.

Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of suppliers

You're assessing the supplier landscape for Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK) as of late 2025, following a significant portfolio restructuring. The power suppliers hold over TUSK is shaped by the company's deliberate shift away from large, capital-intensive segments.

Low leverage due to small scale after divesting major assets.

The divestiture of major infrastructure assets has definitely shrunk the overall procurement footprint, which generally reduces leverage with broad-based suppliers. Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. completed the sale of its infrastructure subsidiaries-5 Star Electric, Higher Power Electrical, and Python Equipment-for an aggregate sales price of $108.7 million in April 2025. This move, coupled with the later divestiture of Piranha assets in the Sand segment during the third quarter of 2025, has made the remaining entity much leaner. To give you a sense of the current scale, total revenue from continuing operations for the third quarter of 2025 was only $14.8 million. As of September 30, 2025, total assets stood at $336.7 million, a notable reduction from $442.9 million the prior year, reflecting this focused strategy. This smaller operational base means fewer high-volume, long-term contracts for general supplies, potentially limiting TUSK's ability to demand steep concessions from suppliers of common goods.

Reliance on specialized vendors for new aviation fleet expansion.

The strategic pivot toward rental services, specifically aviation, introduces a different set of supplier dynamics. Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. is now more reliant on specialized vendors for these newer assets. The company purchased eight small passenger aircraft under lease with a commuter airline for an aggregate amount of approximately $11.5 million. Furthermore, capital expenditures for the rental services segment, largely driven by this aviation fleet expansion, totaled $17,185 (units unclear, but representing significant investment) for the nine months ended September 30, 2025. When acquiring or maintaining highly specific equipment, like these aircraft or specialized rental units, the number of qualified vendors shrinks, inherently increasing the bargaining power of those specialized suppliers.

Sand segment's dependence on rail and trucking logistics for distribution.

For the remaining Natural Sand Proppant Services segment, the power dynamic shifts toward logistics providers. While the company sold off hydraulic fracturing equipment, the sand itself still needs to move. The Q2 2025 results showed a noncash impairment charge of $31.7 million related to the Northern White Sand mine, which sits on the Union Pacific Railroad. This highlights a critical dependence on rail infrastructure and, by extension, the trucking companies needed for final-mile delivery. If rail capacity tightens or trucking rates spike, Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. has limited immediate alternatives to absorb those increased costs, especially since Q3 2025 sand revenue was only $2.7 million. The tons sold in Q3 2025 were 122,000 tons, a volume that still requires reliable, contracted logistics.

Equipment suppliers face cyclical demand, giving TUSK some negotiating power.

Conversely, for the equipment that remains in the rental fleet, the cyclical nature of the broader energy market can temporarily shift leverage back toward Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. Suppliers of general oilfield or construction equipment often face volatile demand. When the market softens, these suppliers are eager to secure any available utilization or maintenance contracts. Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. exited the well completion services business by selling its pressure pumping equipment for $15 million in June 2025, suggesting they are less exposed to the most volatile equipment cycles now. Still, for the equipment they do own and rent out, periods of low utilization for the broader industry mean TUSK can push for better terms on maintenance, parts, or even new equipment financing from manufacturers looking to move inventory. Here's the quick math: a supplier facing idle capacity is more willing to negotiate on a $1.0 million service contract than one operating at peak capacity.

The supplier power profile for Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. is therefore mixed, leaning toward stronger supplier power in specialized areas like aviation and logistics, but retaining some leverage with general equipment providers during industry troughs.

Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday.

Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of customers

You're looking at the customer side of the equation for Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK), and honestly, the power they hold is quite significant across the different segments Mammoth serves. When you look at the E&P (Exploration and Production) customers, their leverage is directly tied to the commodity markets, which, as you know, can swing wildly.

This customer power definitely shows up as pricing pressure in the Natural Sand Proppant business. For the third quarter of 2025, the average sales price for the sand Mammoth sold was just $18.26 per ton. That's a noticeable drop when you compare it to the $21.41 per ton they got in the second quarter of 2025, and even further from the $22.89 per ton average in the third quarter of 2024. When prices fall, E&P customers push hard on service providers to lower input costs, and Mammoth's realized price reflects that reality. The segment revenue for Q3 2025 was only $2.7 million, down from $5.4 million in Q2 2025, showing reduced volume and/or price realization.

Here's a quick look at how the Sand segment's pricing has moved:

That table shows you exactly where the customer leverage is biting hardest. It's a tough spot when your realized price drops nearly 20% sequentially.

Then you have the lingering issue of past customer concentration risk, which is highlighted by the ongoing situation with the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA). While Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. is debt-free, the final installment of the settlement is still pending confirmation of PREPA's plan of adjustment. That remaining amount is $20 million. Management noted that subsequent to the September 30, 2025, quarter-end, approximately $19.8 million of restricted cash related to the PREPA letter of credit was released, which did boost liquidity, but the finality of that $20 million payment remains contingent on an external entity's bankruptcy process. This history shows the risk of over-reliance on a single, large, financially distressed customer.

For the utility side of the business, where Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. provides engineering and fiber optic services, the dynamic shifts toward competitive procurement. We see this reflected in the Infrastructure Services segment revenue for Q3 2025, which was $4.8 million, up from $4.4 million in Q3 2024, primarily due to an increase in fiber optic activity. This suggests that while the utility work is active, these customers are definitely using competitive processes to award contracts, keeping service providers sharp on pricing and execution.

The power of these utility customers is evident in the segment performance:

• Utility customers frequently use competitive bidding for fiber optic work.
• Infrastructure Services revenue was $4.8 million in Q3 2025.
• The overall company revenue for Q3 2025 was $14.8 million.
• The company maintained total liquidity of $153.4 million as of September 30, 2025.

So, you have commodity-driven price erosion on one side and competitive bidding on the other. It definitely keeps the pressure on Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. to control costs; their SG&A run rate was lowered to around $21 million exiting the third quarter, roughly half of the 2024 level, excluding Puerto Rico legal costs.

Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday.

Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK) - Porter's Five Forces: Competitive rivalry

You're looking at the competitive landscape for Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK) right now, late in 2025, and the rivalry is definitely a defining feature, especially in the legacy oilfield services areas.

The market for oilfield services-think sand, drilling support, and rentals-remains highly fragmented. Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. is operating as a niche player within this environment. For the third quarter of 2025, total revenue from continuing operations was just $14.8 million. That small revenue base, relative to the overall energy services sector, shows you how specialized or small its current footprint is after recent strategic moves.

To show you where that revenue came from, here's the quick math on the segment performance for Q3 2025:

This breakdown confirms the fragmentation; no single legacy service line dominates the small revenue base.

In the infrastructure segment, which focuses on electric grid construction and repair for utilities, Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. faces competition from larger, better-capitalized utility contractors. To be fair, Mammoth has already taken steps to reduce its exposure here, selling subsidiaries like 5 Star Electric, LLC, Higher Power Electrical, LLC, and Python Equipment LLC to Peak Utility Services Group, Inc. for an aggregate sales price of $108.7 million in April 2025. Still, the remaining Infrastructure Services segment generated $4.8 million in revenue for Q3 2025, meaning rivalry persists with established players in that space.

A key strategic action that directly impacts rivalry is the exit from hydraulic fracturing. Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. sold all of its equipment used in its hydraulic fracturing business in a $15 million deal, which closed around June 16, 2025. This move effectively removed Mammoth from direct, head-to-head competition with the major frac providers, allowing management to focus capital elsewhere, like deploying approximately $40 million year-to-date to grow and diversify its aviation portfolio.

The competitive dynamics are shifting based on these portfolio changes:

• Drilling segment revenue more than tripled sequentially in Q3 2025, reaching its highest gross margin in history, showing success in that specific niche.
• Sand segment revenue fell 49% quarter-over-quarter to $2.7 million due to the Piranha asset divestiture.
• The company is debt-free and ended Q3 2025 with total liquidity of $153.4 million.

Finance: draft a scenario analysis on competitive pricing pressure in the Drilling segment for Q4 2025 by next Tuesday.

Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK) - Porter\'s Five Forces: Threat of substitutes

The threat of substitutes for Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK) is present across its key operating segments, driven by performance characteristics, cost structures, and customer flexibility.

Natural Sand Proppant Substitutes

High substitutability exists for Natural Sand Proppant due to the availability of higher-performance alternatives, though natural sand maintains a significant cost advantage. Alternative proppants like resin-coated sands and ceramic proppants offer superior performance in extreme downhole conditions, such as high pressure and temperature, capturing a segment of the market, particularly in deepwater and high-stress shale formations. Ceramic Proppant, an artificial substitute, is expected to grow significantly at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 7.1% during the forecast period, as it possesses higher crush strength than sand, making it suitable for wells with higher closure stresses. However, Natural Sand Proppant remains dominant, accounting for around 83% of the total proppants usage due to its efficiency, low cost, and availability. Mammoth Energy Services, Inc.'s own Natural Sand Proppant Services segment revenue for the third quarter of 2025 was $2.7 million, with approximately 122,000 tons sold at an average price of $18.26 per ton.

Infrastructure Services Substitution

For Infrastructure Services, customers possess the capability to substitute Mammoth Energy Services, Inc.'s specialized engineering and design work. Infrastructure customers can utilize in-house utility teams or engage other engineering firms. Many of Mammoth Energy Services, Inc.'s contracts, including Master Service Agreements (MSAs), are opened to competitive bid upon expiration, meaning there is no assurance of retaining existing work. Furthermore, under these agreements, customers often have no obligation to assign a specific amount of work. Mammoth Energy Services, Inc.'s strategic transformation in 2025 included the sale of three infrastructure subsidiaries for an aggregate sales price of $108.7 million, which signals a reduction in the company's direct exposure to this segment's substitution risk, though the remaining Infrastructure Services segment generated revenue of $4.8 million in Q3 2025, up 9% year-over-year.

• Infrastructure customer capital expenditure budgets are sensitive to the outcomes of rate cases conducted by governing bodies.
• Delays or reductions in government appropriations can negatively impact project volume.

Rental Services Switching Costs

The Rental Services segment faces a threat from low switching costs for customers moving between equipment providers. While Mammoth Energy Services, Inc.'s Rental Services revenue grew 72% year-over-year in the second quarter of 2025 to $3.1 million, the nature of equipment rental generally implies low barriers for a customer to choose a different supplier for their next rental period. The company expanded its aviation rental offerings in 2025, purchasing eight small passenger aircraft for an aggregate amount of approximately $11.5 million, which adds to the asset base but does not inherently raise customer switching costs for the rental service itself.

Demand Inelasticity vs. Supplier Flexibility

The core demand for utility and energy services, which underpins the Infrastructure segment, is generally considered inelastic in the long term as maintenance and upgrades are necessary. However, the supplier, Mammoth Energy Services, Inc., is not insulated from demand shifts, as evidenced by the variability in its segment revenue. For example, Infrastructure Services revenue was $30.7 million in the first quarter of 2025 but dropped to $4.8 million in the third quarter of 2025, following the sale of three subsidiaries for $108.7 million. The company's ability to perform through cycles is tested by customer budget constraints tied to regulatory outcomes, meaning the supplier's revenue stream is highly elastic to customer capital planning, even if the underlying need for utility service remains constant.

• Q1 2025 Infrastructure Services Revenue: $30.7 million.
• Q3 2025 Infrastructure Services Revenue (Post-Divestiture): $4.8 million.
• The company's adjusted EBITDA from continuing operations for Q3 2025 was a loss of ($4.4) million.

Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of new entrants

When you look at the barriers to entry for new competitors wanting to challenge Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. (TUSK), you see a mixed bag, but the capital requirements in certain areas definitely keep the field thin. It's not like starting a simple consulting shop; this is heavy equipment and specialized infrastructure.

For the Rental Services segment, especially the aviation side Mammoth has been building out, the capital barrier is high. Honestly, you can't just rent a few trucks and call it a day. Consider the move Mammoth made: they purchased eight small passenger aircraft under lease with a commuter airline for an aggregate amount of approximately \$11.5 million. That single transaction sets a hefty initial price tag for anyone wanting to compete directly in that specific niche of aircraft rentals. Also, look at the recent spending; capital expenditures primarily for the expansion of Mammoth Energy Services, Inc.'s aviation rental fleet for the three months ended September 30, 2025, totaled \$17,185 (in thousands, or \$17.185 million). That shows the commitment needed just to keep pace.

The utility infrastructure sector, where Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. has a presence despite recent divestitures, presents significant regulatory and certification hurdles. While Mammoth sold off some of its infrastructure subsidiaries for an aggregate sales price of \$108.7 million, the remaining or adjacent work in utility services requires navigating complex compliance and certification processes that take time and specialized knowledge to acquire. New entrants face a steep learning curve just to get qualified to bid on major utility contracts.

In the Natural Sand Proppant segment, the threat of new entrants is generally lower because of the sheer scale of investment required to compete effectively. You need more than just sand; you need the means to get it to the well site. This means significant upfront costs for mine development and securing long-term, cost-effective rail access for transportation. Without that infrastructure locked in, a new competitor is immediately at a cost disadvantage against established players like Mammoth Energy Services, Inc.

Overall, you can assess the threat as moderate. Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. has strategically shifted away from the lower-margin infrastructure services-which they sold for \$108.7 million-to focus on capital-intensive, niche areas like specialized equipment rentals, particularly aviation. This focus on capital-intensive assets acts as a natural barrier. Here's a quick snapshot of the financial context as of late 2025:

The need for substantial, specialized capital-like the \$11.5 million spent on aircraft-and the established logistics for sand mean that while a small operator might enter a minor service line, replicating Mammoth Energy Services, Inc.'s scale in its core, capital-heavy areas is tough. If onboarding takes 14+ days, churn risk rises, but for a new entrant, the time to even start operating is much longer due to the required asset base.

The barriers you face from new entrants are primarily:

• High capital outlay for aviation fleet expansion.
• Securing mine development and rail access for proppant.
• Navigating utility sector certification requirements.
• The cost of acquiring specialized, large-scale rental equipment.

Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday.