Nikola Corporation (NKLA): 5 FORCES Analysis [Nov-2025 Updated]

You're looking at a commercial vehicle maker that just navigated a Chapter 11 restructuring in February 2025, and you need to know if the competitive landscape has changed for the better or worse. Honestly, the environment for this hydrogen truck maker is brutal; think about it-suppliers hold massive leverage after the bankruptcy, and customers are rightly nervous about support for the few hundred trucks delivered last year. We're talking about a company with trailing twelve-month revenue of just $75.52 million as of November 2025, fighting against giants like Daimler and Tesla in a market where diesel still owns 57% of heavy-duty sales. Below, I break down the five forces-from supplier grip to the threat of battery-electric substitutes-to map out exactly where the near-term risks and opportunities lie for this player in the zero-emission space.

Nikola Corporation (NKLA) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of suppliers

The bargaining power of suppliers for Nikola Corporation remains a significant factor, especially given the company's recent restructuring and its reliance on complex, high-value components for its zero-emission truck platforms. You see this power concentrated in a few key areas, which directly translates to cost control and margin pressure.

The reliance on a limited pool of specialized suppliers for core technologies, like the fuel cell power modules and the high-density battery packs for both the FCEV and BEV lines, inherently grants those suppliers leverage. Historically, Nikola has focused on driving down the Bill of Materials (BOM) cost, as evidenced by a prior goal to realize approximately $100,000 in material savings per Tre BEV by the end of 2023 through battery pack changes. Any failure to secure favorable long-term pricing on these inputs keeps gross margins suppressed.

For the HYLA energy side, the power of hydrogen infrastructure providers is clear, though the landscape shifted dramatically in mid-2025. Prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, Nikola had a definitive agreement with Voltera to develop up to 50 HYLA stations over five years, supporting an initial plan to have 60 stations by 2026. Furthermore, a key supplier like Plug Power was on track to have a 500 TPD (tons per day) green hydrogen generation network in North America by 2025. Now, the new owner of Nikola's physical assets, Hyroad Energy, is establishing its own infrastructure partnerships, such as one with Pacific Clean Fuels and OneH2, targeting deployment around the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach starting January 2026. This transition shows that the infrastructure supply chain's leverage has been transferred or is being re-established outside of Nikola's direct control.

Supplier power became demonstrably high following the bankruptcy, as the market saw the value of Nikola's physical and intangible assets acquired by a third party. Hyroad Energy purchased 113 hydrogen fuel cell trucks, spare parts, software, and all Intellectual Property (IP) for a total consideration of $3.85 million. This package included new tractors and demo units valued at $51.74 million and raw material/subassembly inventory valued at over $55.9 million, meaning the assets were acquired for a fraction of their stated value, highlighting the collapse of leverage Nikola previously held with its upstream partners and inventory holders.

The direct impact of component costs on Nikola's profitability is starkly visible in the last reported full financial results. For the third quarter of 2024, Nikola reported a negative GAAP Gross Margin of -246% and a Gross Loss that widened to $61.9 million. The average selling price (ASP) for FCEVs contracted 7% quarter-over-quarter to $361K in Q3 2024, as the company prioritized volume over pricing while attempting to lower the BOM.

Here are the key figures illustrating the financial impact and asset transfer related to Nikola Corporation's supply chain and asset base as of late 2025:

The immediate next step is for the remaining Nikola entity to secure new, stable, and cost-effective long-term supply agreements for fuel cell stacks and battery cells, or risk the continued erosion of any potential future gross margin. Finance: review Q3 2024 BOM against current spot pricing for key raw materials by next Tuesday.

Nikola Corporation (NKLA) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of customers

You're looking at Nikola Corporation's customer power right after the February 2025 Chapter 11 filing. Honestly, the power shift toward the buyer is dramatic.

• - Power is very high, as the February 2025 bankruptcy left customers without maintenance and support.
• - Customers face high switching costs but also risk of stranded assets (limited service/support operations planned only through the end of March 2025).
• - Large fleet buyers (e.g., DHL) can demand significant concessions due to low sales volume (e.g., 203 trucks shipped in the first three quarters of 2024).
• - Buyers have many alternatives from established OEMs and other EV startups.

The immediate consequence of the February 19, 2025, bankruptcy filing was the uncertainty over ongoing support. Nikola stated it intended to continue limited service and support operations, including HYLA fueling operations, only through the end of March 2025, subject to court approval. After that date, the company explicitly noted it would need one or more partners to support such activities. This leaves customers holding assets-their trucks-with an immediate, hard deadline for guaranteed OEM support, which definitely elevates their bargaining position for any remaining services or asset disposition terms.

For fleet operators, the risk of stranded assets is real. While switching costs might be high-think about the capital outlay for the trucks themselves and the specialized hydrogen infrastructure investment for the FCEVs-the lack of a clear, long-term service roadmap forces immediate negotiation. Consider the scale: Nikola delivered only 88 Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEVs) in the third quarter of 2024, marking a delivery record at the time, but this volume is tiny in the context of fleet replacement needs. The total number of FCEVs wholesaled for the first nine months of 2024 was 235 units.

Large buyers, even those with small initial deployments, gain leverage from Nikola's precarious position. For example, DHL Supply Chain and Diageo North America planned to add just two Nikola fuel cell electric trucks to their fleet by the end of 2024. Even with this small initial commitment, the bankruptcy means these buyers, and others, can demand significant concessions regarding warranties, service contracts, or buy-back terms, knowing Nikola's primary goal is an asset sale to maximize creditor recovery.

Here's a quick look at the delivery context that underscores the low volume leverage buyers have:

Buyers are not captive. They have viable alternatives. Established original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) like Paccar, and other emerging EV/FCEV startups, offer proven service networks and financial stability. Furthermore, the broader HFCV market, which Nikola was a part of, is projected to grow significantly, with top players including Toyota, Hyundai, and BMW, meaning customers can easily pivot their zero-emission strategy away from the bankrupt entity. Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday.

Nikola Corporation (NKLA) - Porter's Five Forces: Competitive rivalry

You're looking at a segment of the heavy-duty trucking industry that is fundamentally reshaping itself, so the competitive rivalry Nikola Corporation faces is fierce, perhaps the most defining force in its current strategy.

The zero-emission Class 8 truck market is not an empty field; it's a battleground where Nikola is fighting against both established giants and well-capitalized disruptors. The pressure is immense because the incumbents are mobilizing their massive resources. For instance, Daimler Truck North America (DTNA) still held an approximate $\mathbf{42\%}$ market share in the traditional Class 8 diesel segment, giving them a huge installed base to transition. Daimler is clearly accelerating its electric push, reporting $\mathbf{1,833}$ Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) truck sales in Q3 $\mathbf{2025}$, which was a $\mathbf{175\%}$ year-over-year increase.

Then you have Tesla Semi, which, after years of limited deployment, is finally set to scale. Tesla expects its first builds of the high-volume design late in $\mathbf{2025}$, with a dedicated factory aiming for an annual capacity of $\mathbf{50,000}$ units, ramping up early in $\mathbf{2026}$. This signals a major escalation in direct competition for battery-electric Class 8 sales.

Nikola's own position within the overall zero-emission Class 8 market is still nascent, which intensifies the fight for every single sale. While Nikola has managed to dominate its niche-reporting over $\mathbf{90\%}$ share in the North American heavy-duty Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle (FCEV) market based on Q3 $\mathbf{2024}$ data-the total zero-emission Heavy-Duty Truck (HDT) market (Classes 7-8) remains small. In Q1 $\mathbf{2025}$, zero-emission HDT registrations were only $\mathbf{283}$ units, down from $\mathbf{329}$ in Q1 $\mathbf{2024}$, representing just $\mathbf{0.47\%}$ of the total HDT market.

The outline suggests Nikola's market share in the broader zero-emission Class 8 space was low, around $\mathbf{1-2\%}$ in $\mathbf{2024}$. This low penetration, set against the backdrop of major OEM activity, means Nikola must fight aggressively for every fleet adoption.

Here's a quick look at the competitive landscape dynamics:

• Tesla Semi high-volume production expected by end of $\mathbf{2025}$.
• Daimler Truck AG aims for $\mathbf{25,000}$ ZEV unit sales in Europe by $\mathbf{2030}$.
• Daimler held $\mathbf{83.7\%}$ share of zero-emission Medium-Duty Truck (MDT) registrations in Q1 $\mathbf{2025}$.
• Nikola sold $\mathbf{88}$ Class 8 hydrogen fuel cell trucks in Q3 $\mathbf{2024}$.

This rivalry is further exacerbated by Nikola's weak financial position. You see, when you are fighting for market share against companies with deep pockets, your own balance sheet matters. As of November $\mathbf{2025}$, Nikola's Trailing Twelve Month (TTM) revenue was only $\mathbf{\$75.52 \text{ million}}$. That figure, frankly, puts immense pressure on every pricing decision.

The need to win volume at any cost is driving down potential profitability across the board. As the zero-emission commercial vehicle sector expands, driven by mandates like California's, pricing competition is definitely rising. This dynamic squeezes margins for everyone, but it hits a company with $\mathbf{\$75.52 \text{ million}}$ in TTM revenue much harder than it hits a Daimler, whose North American segment still posted a $\mathbf{14.4\%}$ adjusted Return on Sales (ROS) in Q2 $\mathbf{2025}$ despite overall sales dips.

We can map out some of the key players and their recent zero-emission activities:

The intensity here is a function of both the high stakes-capturing the future of freight-and the low current sales volume in the zero-emission space, which means every single truck sold by a competitor is a larger percentage loss for Nikola.

Nikola Corporation (NKLA) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of substitutes

The threat of substitutes for Nikola Corporation's zero-emission truck offerings is substantial, stemming from both incumbent technologies and emerging alternative powertrains.

Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs) represent a strong and rapidly advancing substitute, particularly for Nikola Corporation's target regional-haul segment. While established diesel trucks still hold the majority share, BEV performance metrics are closing the gap for predictable routes.

The Hydrogen Internal Combustion Engine (H2ICE) truck is an emerging, lower-cost substitute leveraging existing diesel engine components, though it is being introduced on a small scale.

• MAN Truck & Bus plans to deliver around 200 hydrogen combustion engine trucks in 2025.
• The MAN hTGX offers a range up to 600 kilometres.

The practical viability of hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs), which compete directly with Nikola Corporation's primary offering, is severely hampered by the current refueling infrastructure.

The lack of widespread hydrogen refueling stations makes both diesel and BEV alternatives more immediately practical for many operators.

• US operational hydrogen refueling stations totaled 89 at the end of 2024.
• Of the US stations at the end of 2024, 74 were located in California.
• California projects only 87 stations established by the end of 2025, missing its target of 200.

Nikola Corporation (NKLA) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of new entrants

You're looking at the threat of new players jumping into the zero-emissions heavy-duty space, and honestly, it's a mixed bag. The threat level sits in that tricky moderate-to-high zone. Why high? Because government incentives are still strong, and the market is growing fast-the outline suggests an estimated $15 billion market size for 2025, which aligns with the broader zero-emission vehicle market showing a USD 321,501 Million valuation in 2025.

Still, the capital needed to even get off the ground is a massive hurdle. Manufacturing trucks and building out the necessary hydrogen or charging infrastructure requires serious cash outlay. For hydrogen infrastructure, which Nikola heavily relies on, the initial capital expenditure is substantial, acting as a real deterrent for a startup. What this estimate hides is the variation in infrastructure cost based on capacity and technology.

Here's a quick look at what building out that essential infrastructure can cost, which definitely raises the barrier to entry for any newcomer:

The market itself is sending a very clear, very expensive signal. Nikola Corporation filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on February 19, 2025, is defintely a stark warning sign. It shows that even with early mover advantage and significant hype, the path to profitability and scale in this capital-intensive sector is fraught with failure risk. New entrants see that and think twice.

But let's talk about the incumbents. Established Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) have scale and dealer networks that new players like Nikola simply didn't have, or couldn't build fast enough. The established players are already capturing the lion's share of the zero-emission heavy truck market as of mid-2025. For example, Volvo and Renault, under the Volvo Group umbrella, commanded a combined share of more than 50% of all ZE heavy truck sales in the first half of 2025. Even a strong player like MAN managed to grow its share to 10% in that same period. That existing footprint makes it tough for a new entrant to secure initial fleet sales without massive subsidies or disruptive technology.

So, while government money attracts attention, the sheer cost of entry and the entrenched position of the legacy OEMs keep the door from swinging wide open. Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday.