Kubient, Inc. (KBNT): 5 FORCES Analysis [Nov-2025 Updated]

You're trying to assess the competitive moat for Kubient, Inc. in late 2025, but the reality you'll find below is far from a standard industry review; it's a financial autopsy. Following the Chapter 7 liquidation and the legal fallout from the accounting fraud-which saw the former CEO convicted in March 2025-the traditional five forces framework reveals an entity with zero operational revenue and a market cap of zero. Here's the quick math: creditors have absolute power over the scant $\text{3.34 million}$ in remaining assets, while every customer has already jumped ship, having zero switching costs. Keep reading to see how this failure reshaped the power dynamics for suppliers, customers, and rivals in the ad-tech space, turning Kubient, Inc. into a cautionary tale rather than a competitor.

Kubient, Inc. (KBNT) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of suppliers

When you look at Kubient, Inc. as of late 2025, the bargaining power of suppliers is almost entirely dictated by the Chapter 7 liquidation status, which started on July 25, 2024. Forget about standard supply chain leverage; here, the power dynamic has shifted completely to those owed money, the creditors.

Creditors have absolute power in Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings, period. The entire purpose of this proceeding is to liquidate assets to pay off debts according to a strict statutory hierarchy. The company's ability to negotiate terms or secure future supplies is zero because the entity is non-operational, so the focus is purely on recovery from the remaining estate.

Former vendors and employees are now unsecured creditors with limited recourse. They are at the bottom of the payment totem pole, behind secured creditors and administrative costs. Their ability to influence Kubient, Inc. is non-existent, and their financial outcome depends entirely on what's left after senior claims are satisfied. Honestly, the claims deadline of November 15, 2024, has passed, meaning the window for formal participation is closed, further limiting their leverage.

Here's a quick look at the financial backdrop that defines this supplier/creditor power structure:

The company's remaining assets of approximately $3.34 million are insufficient to cover all claims, even based on the initial liability figure of $2.88 million. Why? Because in Chapter 7, secured creditors get paid first from the proceeds of their specific collateral. Any remaining funds are then distributed to unsecured creditors, which is where most vendors and employees fall. The actual recovery for unsecured creditors is almost certainly a fraction of their total claim amount, which is why their power is so limited.

Technology providers have zero dependence on the non-operational entity. You can see this dynamic play out in the past, like the fraudulent $1.3 million transaction involving Kubient, Inc. and "Company-1," where neither party delivered the agreed-upon services for KAI testing. That situation, which involved Kubient paying $1,300,336 and receiving $1,300,338.03 back, shows a history of non-reciprocal vendor relationships. Now, with the company in Chapter 7, any past technology provider has no future business to lose, meaning their bargaining power is effectively zero. They are just another unsecured creditor hoping for a distribution.

The reality for any remaining supplier is stark:

• The entity is in Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings.
• The trustee, Alfred T. Giuliano, controls asset disposition.
• The stock trades for pennies, currently at $0.000300 USD as of November 21, 2025.
• Future service contracts or technology licensing are impossible.

Finance: review the trustee's latest public filings for estimated unsecured creditor payout percentages by next Tuesday.

Kubient, Inc. (KBNT) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of customers

You're looking at the customer power dynamic for Kubient, Inc. (KBNT) as of late 2025, and honestly, the situation is stark. When a company enters liquidation, the bargaining power of its customers-or what's left of them-becomes absolute because the service they were buying simply doesn't exist anymore. The platform, the Audience Cloud, is non-operational following the Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing on July 25, 2024.

This operational failure means that for any potential or former customer, the switching cost is effectively zero because there is nothing to switch from. Every customer who was using the platform has, by necessity, fully defected to competitors in the programmatic advertising space. The market reality is that Kubient, Inc. is no longer a going concern providing a service; it is an entity in the process of asset disposition.

The financial data for 2025 confirms this collapse of the core business relationship. While the Trailing Twelve Month (TTM) revenue as of November 2025 stands at $1.17 million, the latest reported quarterly revenue is near zero at $0.01 million. This near-zero figure for a recent quarter is the clearest indicator that revenue from core operations has ceased. To put this into perspective against the company's past, the market capitalization as of November 8, 2025, was a mere $4,418.00, with the stock trading at $0.0003 per share on November 23, 2025.

The ultimate erosion of customer trust stems directly from the governance failures. The conviction and sentencing of former CEO Paul Roberts in March 2025 for securities fraud cemented the market's view of the company's integrity. This wasn't a minor accounting error; Roberts improperly recognized over $1.3 million in fraudulent revenue, which represented over 94% of Kubient, Inc.'s reported revenue for 2020 at the time of its Initial Public Offering. This act of cooking the books destroyed any faith customers might have had in the technology, especially since the fraud related to misrepresenting the efficacy of the KAI fraud detection tool itself.

Here's a quick look at the financial metrics that quantify the severity of the situation that customers reacted to:

The implications for customer power are clear, and you can see the effect in the company's current state:

• Platform functionality is zero; service delivery is impossible.
• Switching costs are non-existent for any remaining prospect.
• Trust is completely compromised due to the $1.3 million fraud.
• The company raised over $32.5 million in public offerings based on these misrepresentations.
• The company is in Chapter 7 liquidation, meaning customer recourse is limited to the liquidation process.

If onboarding takes 14+ days, churn risk rises-but here, onboarding is impossible, so the risk is 100% customer loss. Finance: draft liquidation asset recovery projection by Monday.

Kubient, Inc. (KBNT) - Porter's Five Forces: Competitive rivalry

You're looking at the competitive rivalry for Kubient, Inc. (KBNT) as of late 2025, and the reality is stark: the force of rivalry is now zero because the company is no longer an active market participant. Kubient, Inc. filed a voluntary petition for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on July 25, 2024. This move effectively ended its role as a competitor in the ad-tech space. The primary focus now is the orderly disposition of remaining assets by the court-appointed trustee, Alfred T. Giuliano, to satisfy creditor claims.

Before this operational cessation, the rivalry you faced was intense, driven by much larger, better-capitalized entities. To put the scale difference in perspective, consider a major player like Criteo S.A. For the full fiscal year 2024, Criteo reported revenue of $1.9 billion. Even in the third quarter of 2025, Criteo reported revenue of $470 million. This level of financial backing and scale created an environment where a smaller firm like Kubient, Inc. struggled immensely to compete on resources and market presence.

The financial trajectory leading up to the collapse clearly shows the inability to sustain operations against this rivalry. As of November 2025, the trailing twelve months (TTM) revenue for Kubient, Inc. stood at a mere $1.17 million, with the latest reported quarterly revenue near zero at $0.01 million. This contrasts sharply with earlier periods; for instance, revenue for the quarter ending March 31, 2023, was $11.75K, representing a staggering -99.06% decrease from the preceding quarter. The TTM revenue decline year-over-year was -64.28%. The company's deep unprofitability, reflected in a TTM Net Profit Margin of -566.69%, underscores the unsustainable nature of its competitive position.

Anyway, the broader ad-tech market itself has not cooled off; in fact, the rivalry has intensified through consolidation, which further squeezed any remaining independent players. The market saw an unprecedented wave of M&A activity, with deal volume in the AdTech sector surging by 73% in 2024. This consolidation trend continues into 2025 as firms seek scale economies to manage rising compliance costs and technological complexity. You can see this in the major transactions, such as Omnicom Group's $13.25 billion deal to acquire Interpublic Group in December 2024. The market saw over 100 ad tech, marketing tech, and digital content deals completed in Q3 2024 alone.

Here's a quick look at the competitive landscape's scale, contrasting the struggling firm's final TTM revenue with a successful rival's recent quarterly performance:

The market dynamics that led to Kubient, Inc.'s situation are still very much in play for everyone else. You should definitely track these consolidation moves because they change who you negotiate with next.

Key drivers of the ongoing market rivalry and consolidation include:

• Surge in AdTech M&A activity by 73% in 2024.
• Over 100 ad tech deals in Q3 2024.
• Major deals like Omnicom/IPG valued at $13.25 billion.
• Increased compliance costs from privacy regulations.
• Demand for unified, full-stack solutions.

Finance: draft a memo by next Tuesday outlining the top five acquirers in the ad-tech space from the last 18 months.

Kubient, Inc. (KBNT) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of substitutes

You're looking at the threat of substitutes for Kubient, Inc. (KBNT) as of late 2025, and frankly, the situation is stark, especially given the company's ultimate fate. The threat from substitutes was not just high; it was existential, culminating in the company filing for a voluntary petition for liquidation under Chapter 7 bankruptcy on July 25, 2024. By November 2025, the market capitalization reflected this reality, standing at a mere $4,418.00.

The programmatic advertising space, where Kubient, Inc. operated, is saturated with operational platforms, making substitution seamless for advertisers. The sheer scale of programmatic buying means any alternative that offers comparable reach or better transparency immediately substitutes the incumbent. For context on the environment, the U.S. programmatic ad spend was expected to surpass $270 billion in 2025, capturing over 85% of all digital ad spend. Globally, programmatic was forecast to represent 90% of global digital display ad spend by 2026.

The broader Digital Ad Fraud Detection Software market itself was valued at approximately $4.2 billion in 2023 and is projected to reach $25.8 billion by 2033, indicating massive investment in competing solutions. This environment of intense competition and high capital flow into alternatives directly substitutes any single player, particularly one with compromised integrity.

Superior, trustworthy AI-powered ad optimization tools are readily available across the industry. The market is actively driven by the incorporation of machine learning and artificial intelligence to enhance accuracy and response time. This trend means that advertisers have a deep bench of alternatives that claim to use advanced, verifiable AI/ML algorithms for real-time monitoring and analytics, which directly substitutes the need for Kubient, Inc.'s offering. The general Fraud Detection and Prevention Market is expected to expand at a CAGR of 30.1% between 2024 and 2029, showing where investment dollars are flowing instead.

Advertisers can easily substitute programmatic platforms with direct publisher deals or walled gardens, especially as data privacy concerns shift focus. The move toward first-party data, exemplified by Retail Media Networks (RMNs) growing by 29.3% in 2025, shows a clear path away from open programmatic ecosystems that rely on third-party verification, which is where Kubient, Inc. positioned itself. This substitution is a structural industry shift, not just a competitive one.

The company's proprietary KAI fraud detection was exposed as ineffective and fraudulent, which is the ultimate substitute: the market rejected the product entirely. The founder pleaded guilty to securities fraud for causing the company to improperly recognize more than $1.3 million in fraudulent revenue, which was tied to material misrepresentations about KAI's efficacy. To conceal this, employees were directed to generate fake KAI reports based on made-up metrics and no underlying data at all. This fundamental lack of trust in the core technology-the very thing meant to prevent fraud-is the strongest substitute of all. The market substitute is simple: any platform with a clean bill of health.

• KAI fraud revenue represented over 94% of reported 2020 revenue.
• The founder was sentenced in March 2025 for the scheme.
• The company raised approximately $33 million across two stock offerings based on these misrepresentations.
• The company's stock trades under the OTC Markets (OTCMKTS) as of late 2025.
• The P/E ratio (TTM) as of November 19, 2025, was reported as -0.0003.

Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday.

Kubient, Inc. (KBNT) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of new entrants

You're looking at the threat of new entrants for Kubient, Inc. (KBNT) as of late 2025, and the picture is starkly different than it would be for a healthy, operating competitor. Honestly, the direct threat from new entrants aiming to steal market share from Kubient, Inc. is effectively nil.

The company filed a voluntary petition for liquidation under Chapter 7 on July 25, 2024. When an entity is in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, it has no market share left to lose, so the direct competitive pressure on established players from this specific entity is zero. The stock price as of November 26, 2025, reflects this status, trading at \$0.0003 per share.

However, the failure itself creates a massive, albeit indirect, barrier. The company's collapse serves as a high-profile warning about governance and capital risk in this sector. Consider the capital structure at the time of the filing: assets were listed at \$3.34 million against liabilities of \$2.88 million. This governance failure followed a period where the company raised substantial capital based on questionable figures, taking in over \$12.5 million in its August 2020 IPO and more than \$20 million in its December 2020 secondary offering. That's over \$32.5 million raised that ultimately led to liquidation.

This governance disaster provides a clear, concrete example of the downside risk for any new venture attempting to scale quickly in the digital advertising technology space without proper controls. Here's a quick look at the financial fallout tied to the governance breakdown:

Still, a high barrier to entry remains for any new entrant looking to compete in the ad-tech space generally. This isn't about Kubient, Inc. anymore; it's about the industry itself. New entrants must overcome significant hurdles related to the core technology, data infrastructure, and, critically, establishing market trust.

New entrants must overcome the industry's skepticism, which has been severely amplified by the fraudulent revenue of over \$1.3 million. The market now views claims of AI efficacy-especially around fraud detection, like the Kubient Artificial Intelligence (KAI) tool-with extreme caution. You can't just claim superior technology; you need verifiable, clean data to back it up, something the former CEO tried to fake using reports based on made-up metrics.

The barriers that persist for any aspiring competitor include:

• Securing large-scale, clean, and verifiable data sets.
• Building proprietary technology that demonstrably outperforms existing solutions.
• Achieving regulatory compliance and passing rigorous third-party audits.
• Rebuilding the baseline level of trust in AI-driven ad verification claims.

Finance: review the current landscape of venture capital funding for ad-tech startups by end of Q1 2026.