Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB): 5 FORCES Analysis [Nov-2025 Updated]

You're assessing Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) as it operates in late 2025, a period defined by strong operational results set against a backdrop of intense regulatory oversight. Honestly, the numbers from Q3 2025 tell a compelling story: passenger traffic grew 8% year-over-year to 7.6 million passengers, and the Adjusted EBITDA margin held firm at 74.8%, suggesting solid pricing power despite regulated aeronautical revenues. But as a seasoned analyst, I know the real value is in understanding the friction points-specifically, the extreme power held by the Mexican government (SICT) as the concession grantor and regulator, and the significant leverage wielded by the dominant Ultra-Low-Cost Carriers like VivaAerobus and Volaris over your core revenue stream. Keep reading to see how these five forces-from supplier control to the threat of bus travel substitutes-actually dictate OMAB's near-term strategic flexibility.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of suppliers

When you look at Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB), the supplier side of the equation is heavily weighted by one dominant entity, but the rest of the ecosystem presents a more typical competitive landscape. Honestly, the power here isn't about a single vendor holding you hostage; it's about the government's contractual control over your revenue streams and investment mandates.

The Overwhelming Power of the Concession Grantor

The Mexican Government, through the Ministry of Infrastructure, Communications and Transportation (SICT) and its decentralized entity, the Federal Civil Aviation Agency (AFAC), holds extreme power over Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB). This is because the government is the concession grantor for the 50-year agreements covering OMA's 13 airports, granted back in 1998. The SICT, via AFAC, acts as the principal regulator, dictating the terms under which OMA operates, including the crucial maximum rate ceilings for aeronautical activities. You saw this power in action when AFAC decided to amend the tariff base regulation in October 2023, which OMA is still navigating.

This regulatory control directly impacts OMA's cost structure and investment obligations:

• The concession tax expense is a direct, regulated cost.
• The Master Development Program (MDP) is a mandated investment schedule.
• Tariff revisions, which influence revenue potential, are subject to government approval.

The next major negotiation point is the 2026-2030 MDP, which OMA submitted to AFAC at the end of June 2025, with a resolution expected by December.

Regulated Costs and Mandated Investments

The financial impact of these government relationships is clear in the recent figures. The concession tax expense, a cost that directly grows with revenue because it's tied to the revenue base, was reported at MXN 290 million in the third quarter of 2025. This is a non-negotiable outflow dictated by the Federal Duties Law, though recent changes mean that excess concession tax payments on aeronautical revenues may be added back to the reference value for the next tariff revision starting in January 2026.

Furthermore, the capital expenditure framework is supplier-dependent but government-mandated. The committed investment for the 2021-2025 Master Development Program (MDP) totaled Ps. 15,911 million. This massive outlay requires securing construction and equipment suppliers, but the terms and timing are set by the concession agreement, not by OMA's free negotiation with the supply market.

Here's a look at the financial commitment tied to these supplier-dependent programs:

Financial Metric	Amount (Ps./MXN)	Period/Context
Concession Tax Expense (Q3 2025)	MXN 290 million	Q3 2025
Total Committed MDP Investment	Ps. 15,911 million	2021-2025 Period
Total Q3 Investments (MDP, Maint., Strategic)	Ps. 472 million	Q3 2025

Leverage of Non-Government Suppliers

When we look beyond the government, the power of individual non-government suppliers-like those providing fuel, maintenance services, or IT-is generally lower because the market structure appears fragmented. However, recent cost inflation suggests that while no single supplier may have monopoly power, the collective pressure from service providers is rising, particularly in labor-intensive areas.

For instance, OMA noted significant year-over-year cost increases in Q3 2025, which reflects the leverage suppliers gain through inflation and contract renewals:

• Contracted services expense rose by 16.4%.
• Payroll grew by 10.7% due to wage increases.
• Minor maintenance costs increased by 19.8%.
• Other costs, including IT-related requirements, increased by 22%.

While fuel supply involves major players like Pemex and private entities, which can create price volatility, the overall picture for most operational inputs points toward a fragmented supplier base. Still, the double-digit growth in key operational expenses like contracted services and maintenance shows that OMA cannot entirely dictate terms to its service providers, especially in a tight labor market. The leverage here is more about general market conditions and inflation than supplier concentration.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of customers

You're looking at Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) through the lens of customer power, and honestly, the picture shows significant leverage held by a very small group of buyers. This is classic oligopsony risk in action, where a few large customers dictate terms.

The high concentration risk is immediately apparent. The market for traffic at OMAB's airports is heavily skewed toward two Ultra-Low-Cost Carriers (ULCCs). This dual dominance means that a decision by either airline can drastically alter OMAB's aeronautical revenue stream.

Here's the quick math on that concentration based on the second quarter of 2025 results:

Airline Customer	Q2 2025 Total Traffic Share	Revenue Implication
Viva Aerobus	50%	Dominant negotiation leverage
Volaris	23%	Reinforces dual-oligopoly power
Top Two ULCCs Combined	73%	Extreme customer concentration

VivaAerobus, accounting for 50% of total passenger traffic in Q2 2025, definitely holds significant negotiation leverage over Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB). To put a number on the overall market activity, total passenger traffic across OMAB's network grew by 11% in Q2 2025, reaching 7.2 million passengers, but that growth is concentrated in the hands of these two carriers. Volaris represented another 23% of total traffic in that same quarter, which really solidifies the airline dual-oligopoly power you are seeing here.

The airlines' ability to shift capacity is a major pressure point. They aren't locked into OMAB's airports. If negotiations sour or if competitor airports offer better terms, these carriers can redeploy aircraft. We see evidence of this competitive environment with the growth projections at Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA), which is aiming for up to 8 million passengers in 2025. While cargo traffic at Toluca International Airport saw a steep 21% decline in the first nine months of 2025, the existence of alternatives like AIFA means airlines always have a credible threat to shift marginal or new capacity away from OMAB's portfolio to places like AIFA or Toluca.

Finally, the pricing power of the customer is structurally limited by regulation, but this cap also limits OMAB's ability to raise prices to offset costs, which is another form of pressure.

• Aeronautical revenues are price-regulated by the maximum rate system.
• This system caps the revenue per passenger that Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) can charge airlines.
• In Q2 2025, aeronautical revenue per passenger still rose by 5%, but this is within a regulated framework.
• The regulatory framework is a "dual till" system where commercial revenues are generally exempt, but aeronautical charges are capped.
• The concession tax is currently set at 5% of total gross annual revenues.

So, you have a situation where a few customers hold most of the volume, and the revenue from that volume is capped by the government regulator. That's a tough spot for the airport operator.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) - Porter's Five Forces: Competitive rivalry

The competitive rivalry within the Mexican airport sector for Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) is structurally limited due to the concession model.

Rivalry is limited to three major private groups (OMAB, GAP, ASUR) with distinct geographic monopolies.

• Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte (OMAB) operates 13 airports in the north and center of Mexico.
• Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico (GAP) manages 12 airports, primarily on the Pacific coast.
• Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste (ASUR) holds concessions for 9 airports in the southeast, including Cancún.

This structure means direct competition is primarily for airline route capture and non-aeronautical revenue share, rather than for the primary concession rights themselves.

OMAB's core asset, Monterrey Airport, is a primary growth driver, increasing competition for key routes.

The operational performance at Monterrey Airport in Q3 2025 highlights its importance:

Metric	Value	Context
Total Passenger Traffic (Q3 2025)	7.6 million	Year-over-year growth of 8%.
Monterrey Traffic Growth (Q3 2025)	14%	Main driver for domestic traffic increase.
International Traffic Growth (Q3 2025)	11%	Key routes include San Francisco, Atlanta, and Dallas.
Expected Full-Year 2025 Traffic Growth	7-8%	Company guidance.

Competition is managed via regulated tariffs and mandated infrastructure investments (MDPs).

The regulatory framework dictates pricing and capital deployment, which manages the intensity of price-based rivalry.

• The maximum tariff increase expected from the approved 2026-2030 Master Development Program (MDP) is in the low single digits.
• Total investments in Q3 2025, including MDP, maintenance, and strategic projects, totaled MXN 472 million.
• Commercial revenue per passenger stood at MXN 60 in Q3 2025.

The Adjusted EBITDA margin of 74.8% in Q3 2025 suggests low price competition intensity.

This high margin indicates Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) maintains strong pricing power relative to its operating costs, even with cost pressures noted in payroll (up 10.7%) and contracted services (up 16.4%).

Financial Metric (Q3 2025)	Amount (MXN)	Percentage
Revenue	3.5 billion	Year-over-year growth of 9.8%.
Adjusted EBITDA	2.7 billion	Margin of 74.8%.
Net Income	1.5 billion	Year-over-year increase of 9.1%.
Net Debt/Adjusted EBITDA Ratio	N/A	0.9x at the end of September.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of substitutes

You're analyzing the competitive landscape for Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB), and the threat of substitutes is definitely a key area to watch, especially on the domestic front. Intercity bus travel stands out as the primary substitute for air travel on many of the routes Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. serves.

This bus segment represents an addressable market of 72 million travelers. That's a massive pool of potential customers who might opt for ground transport instead of flying. To be fair, the bus industry in Mexico is substantial; one report pegged the market value in 2024 at USD 641.0 Million, with projections showing continued growth. Furthermore, the entry of major international players like Flix into the Mexican market in the first half of 2025 suggests increasing competition and modernization in this substitute sector, which was valued between $6.3 billion to $8.4 billion by some estimates.

The direct competitive pressure is felt where the modes overlap. Buses compete on 55% of the routes served by a major customer of Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. This overlap creates a very real ceiling on how much Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. can push airfare prices before travelers switch to the bus alternative. For context on Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V.'s current passenger mix, look at the latest available data:

Metric	Value	Context/Period
International Traffic Share (Required Figure)	17%	Q2 2025 Traffic Split
Domestic Traffic Share (Inferred)	83%	Q2 2025 Traffic Split
Total Q2 2025 Passengers	7.2 million	Q2 2025 Traffic Volume
Bus Addressable Market (Travelers)	72 million	Intercity Bus Segment
Bus Route Competition Overlap	55%	Routes Served by Major Customer
Q2 2025 Total Revenue	3.4 billion MXN	Q2 2025 Financials

When you look at the domestic side, that's where the bus threat is most potent. For instance, in Q2 2025, domestic traffic was the vast majority of the 7.2 million total passengers. The domestic growth rates in recent months confirm this focus: August 2025 saw domestic traffic up 6.7%, September 2025 up 8.6%, and October 2025 up 8.3%.

Now, let's talk about rail. High-speed rail infrastructure in Mexico is currently underdeveloped. This lack of robust, modern rail networks significantly limits its viability as a meaningful substitute for the majority of Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V.'s routes right now. The focus remains on road versus air.

The substitution risk shifts dramatically when you consider international travel. For international travel, which accounted for the required 17% of Q2 2025 traffic, the substitution risk is negligible. You just don't see a viable, direct intercity bus substitute for long-haul international routes originating from Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V.'s network.

Here's a quick breakdown of the substitute landscape:

• Primary substitute: Intercity bus travel.
• Bus competition ceiling on airfare: 55% of key routes.
• High-speed rail viability: Limited due to underdeveloped infrastructure.
• International substitution risk: Considered negligible.
• Domestic traffic volume: Approximately 83% of Q2 2025 traffic.

If onboarding takes 14+ days for a new bus operator to scale, churn risk rises for airlines on short-haul routes.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of new entrants

You're looking at the barriers to entry for Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB), and honestly, the deck is stacked heavily against any potential newcomer. The structure of airport operations in Mexico creates formidable, almost insurmountable, hurdles.

The initial 50-year concession, with a potential 50-year renewal, creates an extremely high barrier to entry. Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) operates its 13 airports under concessions granted back in 1998, and the initial term can be extended for an additional period of up to 50 years. This long-term control over prime operational locations effectively locks out new private competition for decades. The regulatory process itself reinforces this, as Master Development Programs (MDPs) are revised every five years with the Mexican Government. For instance, Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB) submitted its proposed MDP for the '26-'30 period at the end of June 2025, showing the cyclical, established nature of these long-term planning agreements.

New entrants require massive, non-recoverable capital expenditure for airport construction and operation. Building a new major airport from scratch represents a colossal financial undertaking. To give you a sense of the scale, the canceled New Mexico City International Airport (NAICM) was projected to cost MX$332 billion. While a state-owned competitor, the Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA), had a reported construction cost of MX$75 billion, this figure still represents an enormous initial outlay that a new private entrant would need to match or exceed for a greenfield site. Contrast this with the ongoing, mandated investment by established players: Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB)'s total investments in Q3 2025, covering MDP, major maintenance, and strategic items, totaled MXN 472 million. The committed investment for Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB)'s 2021-2025 MDP was Ps. 15,911 million.

Government policy favors the three existing private operators and state-owned infrastructure (e.g., AIFA). The concession system itself is the primary policy tool limiting entry. Furthermore, the state-owned AIFA, despite lower passenger numbers-projecting up to 8 million travelers for the full year 2025 compared to Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB)'s Q3 2025 traffic growth-continues to receive significant federal support. For fiscal year 2025, AIFA was expected to receive over MX$924 million in federal budget allocation, and it reported an operating profit of MX$182 million in Q1 2025 on revenues of MX$706 million for that quarter, suggesting a state backstop that private entrants do not possess.

The regulatory framework, including the MDP negotiation, effectively controls and limits new private competition. The entire system is governed by a 'dual till' structure where aeronautical revenues are subject to maximum rate ceilings, while commercial revenues are generally exempt. New entrants would face this same regulated environment, but without the established relationships and operational history. The Federal Civil Aviation Agency (AFAC) is central to this control, approving MDPs. The current traffic mix at the state-run AIFA is heavily domestic, around 94% domestic to 6% international, which suggests a different operational focus than the established operators like Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB), which serves major business centers like Monterrey.

Here's a quick look at the established players' regulatory milestones:

Operator	Regulatory Action	Period/Amount
Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB)	Committed MDP Investment	Ps. 15,911 million (2021-2025)
Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB)	Q3 2025 MDP/Maintenance Investment	MXN 472 million
Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (OMAB)	Concession Tax Rate	5% of total gross annual revenues
Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico (GAP)	MDP/Maximum Tariffs Review Period	2025-2029
Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA)	Projected 2025 Passenger Traffic	Up to 8 million
Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA)	Q1 2025 Operating Profit	MX$182 million

The barriers to entry are fundamentally structural, involving long-term government contracts and the sheer financial muscle required to build competing infrastructure. The key factors keeping new entrants out are:

• Initial concession terms lasting up to 50 years.
• Mandatory, multi-year capital programs like the MDP, requiring billions of pesos, such as Ps. 15,911 million for OMAB's 2021-2025 plan.
• Government support for state-owned facilities, with AIFA receiving over MX$924 million in 2025 budget allocation.
• The regulatory process is managed through established five-year MDP cycles.

If onboarding takes 14+ days, churn risk rises, but here, the risk of a new airport operator emerging is extremely low due to the legal and financial moat. Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday.